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Abstract 
Background: A treatment for patients suffering from prolonged severely altered 
consciousness is not available. The success of Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) in diseases such 
as Parkinson’s, dystonia and essential tremor provided a renewed impetus for its application 
in Disorders of Consciousness (DoC). 
Objective: To evaluate the rationale for DBS in patients with DoC, through systematic review 
of literature containing clinical data and ethical considerations. 
Methods: Articles from PubMed, Embase, Medline and Web of Science were systematically 
reviewed. 
Results: The outcomes of 78 individual patients reported in 19 articles from 1968 onwards 
were pooled and elements of ethical discussions were compared. There is no clear clinical 
evidence that DBS is a treatment for DoC that can restore both consciousness and the ability 
to communicate. In patients who benefitted, the outcome of DBS is often confounded by the 
time frame of spontaneous recovery from DoC. Difficult ethical considerations remain, such 
as the risk of increasing self-awareness of own limitations, without improving overall 
wellbeing, and the issues of proxy consent. 
Conclusion: DBS is far from being evident as a possible future therapeutic avenue for patients 
with DoC. Double-blind studies are lacking, and many clinical and ethical issues have to be 
addressed. In the rare cases when DBS for patients with DoC is considered, this needs to be 
evaluated meticulously on a case by case basis, with comprehensive overall outcome 
measures including psychological and quality-of-life assessments, and with the guidance of an 
ethical and interdisciplinary panel, especially in relation to proxy consent.  
Keywords 
Deep Brain Stimulation; Disorders of Consciousness; Minimally Conscious State; Vegetative 
State; Coma; Neuroethics; Neuromodulation. 
 
CRS-R: JFK Coma Recovery Scale-Revised, CT-DBS: “Central Thalamic” Deep Brain Stimulation, DBS: Deep 
Brain Stimulation, DoC: Disorders of Consciousness, GCS: Glasgow Coma Scale, GOS: Glasgow Outcome 
Scale, MCS: Minimally Conscious State, PCS: Prolonged Coma Scale, PVS: Persistent Vegetative State, TBI: 
Traumatic Brain Injury, UWS: Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome, VS: Vegetative State.  
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Introduction 
What would one do in case a patient survives a severe brain injury, but remains in a chronic 
altered state of consciousness? Some patients seem to be awake, without apparent awareness. 
Other patients seem to be awake as well as slightly aware, but still lack a normal 
consciousness.  
In the concept of consciousness a difference is made between wakefulness and awareness. To 
be awake means to be receptive for stimuli (for instance the eyes are open), while being aware 
means that one is somehow responsive to stimuli (for instance one reacts to a visual cue). The 
state that defines how responsive one is to a stimulus is called arousal. Both wakefulness and 
awareness are needed in order to be conscious. Disorders of Consciousness (DoC) translate 
into different conditions [1] of which some chronic conditions are explained below.  
A clarification of definitions of DoC applied in this review is necessary because various 
distinctions of DoC have been made throughout the literature and over time. 
In the definition of coma, both awareness and wakefulness are absent, though basic 
physiological functions, such as heart rhythm and respiratory function, are maintained. Eyes 
are normally closed and only specific reflexive behavior to stimuli can be observed [1,2]. 
In Vegetative State (VS) awareness of the self and environment is absent, but the eyes are 
open and closed in alternating periods [2]. This intermittent wakefulness was thought to be a 
manifestation of a sleep-wake cycle and a relevant diagnostic criterion [3,4], but actigraphy 
and electrophysiological assessments have demonstrated that the nature of circadian sleep-
wake cycle in VS patients is absent [5,6], while sleep wake patterns are preserved [5]. The 
reduced ability of being awake is a key difference to coma. Responses to stimuli are only 
reflexive and not driven by a conscious behavior. As “Vegetative State” tends to have a bad 
connotation, the label “Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome” (UWS) has been suggested 
instead [7]. 
A Persistent Vegetative State (PVS) denotes a prolonged VS for over 3 months in case of an 
anoxic injury or for ≥1 year after trauma [8,9]. PVS and VS/UWS have the same clinical 
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presentation, but differ in duration. Throughout the literature, this difference is not always 
consistently made, partly because the original definition of PVS [2] was not different from 
VS. 
In Minimally Conscious State (MCS), both wakefulness and awareness are to some degree 
present. The key difference compared to VS is the ability of a patient in MCS to respond 
meaningfully, though inconsistently, to a stimulus. There may be some communication 
(verbal or gestural), or simple commands may be performed [1]. For example, a patient in 
MCS without any motor dysfunction would be able to squeeze the hand when prompted. 
The terms “Coma vigil” (= awake coma), “prolonged coma” and “apallic syndrome” (= lack 
of cortical function) are outdated terms that referred to a condition other than coma, as 
wakefulness is maintained, but these terms lacked specificity [2,10]. They could be equivalent 
to (P)VS or MCS. 
In the literature, various scales have been used for scoring the level of DoC. The JFK Coma 
Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R) has been developed to help in the diagnosis of VS and 
MCS. It measures repeatedly behavioral responses to standardized stimuli, in six categories: 
auditory, visual, motor, verbal, communication and arousal [11]. The CRS-R was developed 
to address shortcomings of the Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) [11]. Analogous to CRS-R, the 
GCS classifies responses to stimuli [12], but it consists of only 3 subscales, and is not reliable 
to discriminate between VS and MCS. The Prolonged Coma Scale (PCS) does not use 
subscales, but is an attempt to represent 10 subsequent behavioral changes when a person 
gradually emerges from coma [13]. The Glasgow Outcome Scale (GOS) has a different 
approach, because it describes the grade of disability of the patient. GOS is based on 4 
categories, from “vegetative state” to “good recovery” [14,15]. 
Since the 1960s researchers have investigated whether DBS could improve DoC. However, 
attempts to obtain a consensus about the use of DBS for chronic DoC have remained in vain. 
Issues concerning safety and effectiveness of the technique, as well as ethical considerations 
have been debated. To the best of our knowledge, there is no systematic review of both 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
5 
patient cases and ethical considerations of DBS for DoC. As these aspects are highly 
intertwined, we conducted a systematic review of the literature to clarify whether DBS 
contributes to improvement of patients with DoC, and to examine the ethical issues 
surrounding DBS in these conditions. 
 
Methods 
A search was performed in 4 databases (PubMed, Embase, Medline and Web of Science), 
using two key concepts: coma in broad sense and DBS. Search words included: (“DBS” OR 
“Deep Brain Stimulation”) AND (“disorder of consciousness” OR “consciousness disorder” 
OR “Minimally Conscious State” OR “coma” OR “Vegetative State” OR “Persistent 
Vegetative State” OR “apallic syndrome” OR “Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome” OR 
“coma vigil”), see Fig. 1. Inclusion criteria were articles in English or French that reported 
treatment with DBS of human patients in a state of MCS, PVS, VS, DoC, coma or related 
prolonged condition affecting consciousness. Additionally, publications concerning ethical 
discussions of DBS for DoC were included. Review articles are screened for any additional 
reference to patient reports of DBS in DoC.  
Excluding criteria were articles published in languages other than English or French and 
articles that did not report nor discuss DBS as treatment for humans with DoC. A first 
selection is made based on titles and abstracts, and a second selection by reading full articles. 
The included papers were classified in two groups: Papers reporting patient data and  papers 
dealing with ethical issues. 
 
Results 
Articles published between 1968 and March 2017 were pooled and duplications were 
removed. Of the 120 unique articles meeting the search criteria, 89 were excluded because 
although they met the search criteria, they did not meet the inclusion criteria (Fig. 1). Four 
additional references concerning patient reports of DBS in DoC were retrieved from screening 
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review articles that met search criteria (McLardy et al. [16], Hassler et al. [17], Sturm et al. 
[18], Hosobuchi et al. [19]). The included articles for the present systematic review were then 
classified in two groups: articles reporting patient data (n=19, see Table 1) and articles 
dealing with ethical issues (n=16, see Table 2). 
Clinical characteristics 
Table 1 shows details of the clinical features of patients with DoC who had received DBS. 
There are 19 articles, published from 1968 onwards, and reporting on 78 unique patients. 
These articles are summarized below. 
Etiology of Disorders of Consciousness and Diagnosis 
The etiology is very different across the 78 patients: traumatic brain injury (TBI) is mentioned 
most (26 cases), followed by anoxic causes (15 cases), vascular causes (11 cases) and other (1 
case). The study of Cohadon & Richer with 25 cases did not provide details on the etiology 
[20]. Throughout the literature, it is not clear whether etiology may predict outcome. 
Time frame 
The represented time frame consists of two components: the interval (between the injury and 
the DBS implant), and the length of follow-up after surgery. The reported intervals in the 
literature varied from 17 days [18] up to 21 years [21]. The follow-up in the majority of the 
cases was reported to be one year or longer, as long as 10 years in a cohort reported by 
Yamamoto et al. [22] and 12 years in some of the 25 patients reported by Cohadon & Richer 
[20]. One exception is the patient reported by Wojtecki et al. [23] for whom no follow-up is 
available. In most reports it is not mentioned whether DBS was applied during the entire 
follow-up. The exception is the patient reported by Schiff et al. [24] where DBS was 
alternated during follow-up using a crossover paradigm. 
Brain targets 
The various brain targets for DBS were: the mesencephalic reticular formation (cuneiform 
nucleus) [13,25], the pallidum [17] and in many cases various areas of the thalamus, including 
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the centromedian parafascicular nucleus, the thalamic reticular nucleus, the intralaminar 
nuclei, the central lateral nucleus and paralaminar region. 
Outcome and outcome measures 
Throughout the literature, the evaluation of the outcome of DBS for DoC has been variable. 
McLardy in 1968 gave a descriptive view of the patient’s level of consciousness and EEG was 
recorded before and after DBS, indicating small changes in activity compared to baseline 
[16]. 
In 1969, Hassler et al. stated that they had improved consciousness in one male [17]. They 
started DBS treatment 17 days after injury and the outcome was “unintelligible vocalization” 
and “spontaneous movements of left limbs”. In 1993, Hosobuchi & Yingling [19] mentioned 
improvements in one male, but without restoring consistent communication. 
In the same year, Cohadon & Richer [20] reported “improvements” of 11 patients: one patient 
improved to a condition with moderate disability (GOS) and 10 patients to a severe disability 
(GOS). An outcome of severe disability based on evaluation with the GOS was also 
mentioned by Yamamoto et al. [13]. 
In 2007, Schiff et al. reported improvements after DBS in one patient who had been in MCS 
for 6 years [24]. The patient´s communication was restored and various behavioral 
improvements using CRS-R subscales were obtained. However, whether the patient remained 
disabled or not, is not specified. A second patient in MCS from this series of 3 single-subject 
studies did not show improvement, scored using CRS-R, while changes in sleep-like patterns 
assessed via EEG were reported after DBS [21]. Two patients in PVS and one in MCS were 
treated with DBS by Magrassi et al. and each improved according to the CRS-R score, but 
consciousness or consistent communication were not restored [26]. In 2017, Chudy et al. 
reported that 3 out of 14 patients regained consciousness after DBS [27]. These three patients 
were diagnosed with MCS and were treated within 1 year of injury. One patient in VS 
improved to MCS, and the remaining 10 other patients did not recover. 
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Ethical considerations 
Table 2 shows details from reviewed papers discussing ethical considerations of DBS for 
DoC. The different perspectives and main ethical issues presented in the 16 articles are 
summarized further below. 
Standardized health care and “therapeutic nihilism” 
The papers state that one key driver to explore the therapeutic potential of DBS in patients 
with DoC stems from the fact that the care of these patients is often reported to be severely 
neglected [28]. The neglect of patients in DoC is partly translated into a lack of standardized 
healthcare that is specific for them [29–31], such as in-patient rehabilitation [31]. As these 
patients cannot communicate whether they are “in pain or emotional distress” [30], they are 
considered to be vulnerable [29,32], and a denial of their needs has been called “therapeutic 
nihilism” [28,30] or “societal neglect syndrome” [33].  
Proxy consent 
Patuzzo and Manganotti stated that “DBS for PVS does not require informed consent”, but 
rather a type of start consent, because DBS could be seen as a “necessary” treatment [34]. 
Bouncing to ethical limits, they seem to be alone in their view, compared with the broad 
consensus in the literature that there is a need for an informed consent by means of surrogate 
[29,35–38]. In order to deal with the vulnerability of the patients, the literature agrees that 
there is a need for an interdisciplinary panel consisting of researchers, specialized physicians, 
as well as family members, to guide in the ethical decisions [28,39,40]. However, it is 
commonly stated that, assuming DBS could restore consciousness, it is still not a treatment 
for disabilities [32]. 
To convey the risks and benefits of an intervention in the consciousness of a person could be 
“ineffable” [41], i.e., something inexplicable “in any ordinary meaning of the term”. This 
does not mean that there is no possibility to consent, but it emphasizes the highly personal 
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approach to assess whether the given consent is thoroughly to protect the patient’s best 
interest [41], especially given the medical nature of DoC [36]. 
Self-awareness of disability and overall outcome 
Emerging from VS and MCS gradually to normal conscious state, could be accompanied by 
restoring self-awareness of own disabilities [42], whereby psychological harm cannot be 
excluded [35]. This could be called the paradox of recovery [33] or the self-awareness 
paradox. However, it has been claimed that the reversibility of DBS [40] could be seen as a 
“mitigating factor” [42] for the self-awareness paradox, because the stimulation can be 
deactivated at any time. Moreover, some authors has been called into question whether 
patients in MCS are always unaware of their situation [33]. Conversely, the true reversibility 
of long term DBS is not yet known [43]. The fact that patients in MCS could be aware of their 
predicament is not further discussed in the literature. 
 
Discussion 
In this review of DBS for DoC, the authors attempted to provide a comprehensive summary 
of published patient reports and of related ethical considerations. Several issues were 
highlighted by this review: there is a disparity among authors in the terminology and 
definitions of states of DoC that hampers interpretation of the role of DBS in these conditions; 
the outcome measures used have been variable and difficult to interpret, and none of them did 
capture aspects of quality-of-life and psychological well-being of the patients; several of the 
patients reported to have improved by DBS did so within a time frame of likely spontaneous 
recovery; DBS in DoC raises many difficult ethical questions, probably more than in any 
other condition in which DBS has been trialed. 
Etiology of Disorders of Consciousness and Diagnosis 
Despite the fact that various authors had hoped to predict the outcome of DBS based on the 
etiology, no correlation was found. Nevertheless, from a theoretical perspective, the 
suggestion has been made to focus on patients with TBI, because the glucose consumption in 
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the brain would be better and because patients in MCS with TBI are more likely to recover 
compared to patients with other etiologies of DoC [28,37]. 
Historically, the terminology used in diagnosis of DoC often lacked specificity. In the oldest 
publications, such as those of Hassler et al. in 1968 and McLardy et al. in 1969, the terms 
“apallic syndrome” or “coma vigil” are used [16,17]. After the introduction of the term PVS 
in 1972 and the call to carefully distinguish between different prolonged conditions affecting 
consciousness [2], some diagnoses were still labeled as “subcoma with unconsciousness” by 
Sturm et al. in 1979 [18], or “apallic state” by Hosobuchi & Yingling as late as 1993 [19].  
While the terminology used for various DoC is currently more specific, the diagnosis of MCS, 
VS and similar states (such as Locked In-Syndrome, which is not a DoC) is still an issue. 
Because the diagnosis relies on subtleties, it is often inaccurate [32]: according to some 
authors, diagnostic errors amount to up to 40% of cases [8,31]. Some of the patients that were 
diagnosed with PVS by Yamamoto et al. were later reclassified by other authors as MCS 
[44,45]. It has also been suggested that diagnosis was sometimes altered on purpose, because 
the patient would have better access to healthcare facilities [30]. Alternatively, the CRS-R 
could be seen as a good standard tool for the diagnosis of (P)VS and MCS [11,31]. To 
distinguish between (P)VS and MCS is important when assessing the potential effect of DBS 
treatment, because in these two conditions the likelihood on a spontaneous recovery differs, as 
discussed below. 
Time frame 
The interval (between the injury and the DBS implant) is important to take into consideration 
in order to avoid ambiguity between a spontaneous recovery and the effect of DBS. The 
Multi-Society Task Force on PVS reported that (spontaneous) recovery from VS lasting 
longer than one month occurs in 30% of patients at 6 months and in 43% at 12 months 
[3,4,46]. Giacino & Kalmar reported a spontaneous recovery rate in 51% of patients by 6 
months for VS, and this percentage increased marginally only at 12 months [47]. If the 
etiology is TBI, the chance of recovery is approximately twice as high compared to non-TBI 
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[3,4,31,47]. The prognosis for MCS is much better compared to that of VS [47]. For example, 
according to Lammi et al., 83% of the patients (15/18) emerged from MCS by 6 months [48]. 
Giacino et al. [31] stated that recovery from MCS was significantly more favorable than 
assumed, with considerable recovery even at long-term (5 years). 
Schiff et al. state that DBS should not be offered within the interval of spontaneous recovery 
from DoC, i.e., certainly not before six months for VS, and not before one year in case of 
MCS [33,36,37]. The reports by Yamamoto et al. [49–51] have been heavily criticized 
because the DBS was performed between 3-6 months after injury [36,44], which is a 
confounding factor for the outcome [8]. Equally, improvements following DBS, that were 
reported in other historical reports, by Cohadon & Richer [20], Hassler et al. [17], and Sturm 
et al. [18], may not be specifically attributed to the DBS. Nonetheless, Chudy et al. [27] 
reported recently on three patients in MCS who had regained consciousness following DBS: 
two of them had received DBS 2 months after cardiac arrest and the third patient 11 months 
after TBI. In these patients, spontaneous recovery cannot be excluded, even if the different 
prognosis for TBI and non-TBI etiology is taken into account [31,36,44,47,48]. 
Brain targets 
According to Schiff, the so-called “Central Thalamus” (CT) is of interest as a target for DBS 
(CT-DBS). The rationale to target the central thalamus is that it is connected to the brainstem 
and frontal cortex, and it is a hub for “arousal systems” and “executive functions” [1,52]. 
Some of these connections are selectively vulnerable to cell death in VS patients [53] and 
although some researchers believe that DBS could reverse this massive thalamic cell death, 
but this has been questioned by others [53,54]. The target “Central Thalamus” is said to be 
different from historical thalamic targets such as CMPf because researchers think it is better 
placed to support an integrated “long range network interactions” instead of the arousal 
system itself [28]. However, even within targeted thalamic parts, the nuclei have different 
properties and connections, and are therefore distinct [37]. Thus, it is challenging to provide a 
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rationale for the choice of a brain target, as long as a precise verification of which subnucleus 
of the thalamus is being stimulated is not available. 
Outcome and outcome measures 
The first outcome that was convincingly shown to be due to DBS, was reported in the patient 
of Schiff et al. [24], thanks to the study design itself: the alternating crossover experiment 
using CRS-R subscales, discriminated between effects of the DBS when it was switched on 
compared to carryover effects and to DBS switched off. However, in the same series of case 
studies [37], Adams et al. [21] failed to obtain a good outcome, although the experimental 
design was adapted from the study of Schiff et al. [24]. A possible reason could be that in 
Schiff´s study, an “intact language networks” had been shown with fMRI before DBS 
application [24], which is important to consider in interpreting the outcome. Indeed, after 
applying well-described patient selection criteria, Magrassi et al. 2016, suggested that the 
majority of patients with DoC would not meet “minimal criteria of brain connectivity” before 
trailing with DBS [26]. Yet, they reported 3 patients who had improved with several points on 
the CRS-R scale, but the patients were not able to communicate consistently. The authors 
stated that, rather than improvements on the CRS-R, it is “restoration of consistent 
communication” that is the aim of DBS for DoC [24], and therefore one could reflect on how 
exceptional the single case study of Schiff et al. was. 
Standardized health care and “therapeutic nihilism” 
It has been stated that because clinicians assume that patients with DoC have a poor 
prognosis, the care of these patients is sometimes withdrawn too quickly [9]: the dilemma of 
whether to continue care or to let the hope for recovery go has been described as ethically 
very difficult. However, it has been shown that the prognosis of DoC seems to be better than 
generally assumed [31]. In any case, some ethicists do point out that while research for new 
treatments is needed, the patient must be protected from futile research [29]. 
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Proxy consent 
Although there is a consensus for proxy consent in the literature, it is also recognized as 
problematic since the surrogate is prone to advocacy [29]. A frequent problem underlying this 
issue is that there is a lack of accurate information to the surrogate on the prospect of what 
DBS would entail for the patient [8,28,29,35], especially since the prognosis is often not clear 
and may be incorrectly labelled as poor [31]. There is also a risk that the intervention 
generates “unreasonable expectations” [43]. Furthermore, the family is often under pressure to 
decide whether to withhold life-sustaining therapy or not, before a clinical observation 
spanning several months is performed [8]. For instance, family members may consent to an 
investigational trial of DBS, in order to ensure more rehabilitation services to the patient [29]. 
On the other hand, a trial of DBS research might limit other treatment alternatives, and 
consequently, families are rather unwilling to consent [31]. It is evident that proxy consent is 
needed, but the circumstances of how it is obtained may raise still ethical questions. 
Self-awareness of disability and overall outcome 
The clinical condition of the patient depends on the specific etiology of a severe brain injury 
[38], and whether it is combined with injury to the spinal cord or other organs (such as in 
multi-trauma patients). The patient may have significant brain damage resulting in cognitive 
impairment, paralysis or a range of disabilities in addition to altered consciousness. Therefore, 
it has been stated that an outcome in terms of physical and cognitive functions is of no value 
without a careful psychological assessment [35,54], which was not performed in any of the 
patient reports reviewed here. While Magrassi et al. [26] suggested that restoring consistent 
communication is the most important clinical target of DBS, it seems at the same time that 
this is the only possibility to enable a psychological assessment in order to address the “self-
awareness paradox”. By the specific nature of treatment of DoC, there is the potential of 
increasing patients’ self-awareness of their own limitations and handicap, and thus the risk of 
affecting negatively the patient’s psychological well-being.  
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Improvements of risk-benefit ratio 
Another clinical and ethical issue concerns the study design. Poor study design in many 
previous studies has led to very confusing clinical conclusions. It has been claimed that in 
many DBS experiments, the risks involved were unnecessary due to lack of a scientific 
rationale [36]. To expose patients to the risks of an unproven technique is only ethical if a fair 
attempt is made to provide more scientific rationale for the potential of the technique. 
One way to improve the risk-benefit ratio is to clarify the study design. In contrast to research 
done before, the study case of Schiff et al. in 2007 [24] was more stringent, and the clinical 
conclusion was less biased, thanks to the double-blind design, the extensive baseline 
assessments, the tests for carryover effects, and the exclusion of spontaneous recovery. 
However, in addition to performing behavioral assessments, a psychological evaluation of the 
patient would have been desirable. In an attempt to address the self-awareness paradox, an 
overall outcome should be carefully assessed to reflect the quality-of-life and psychological 
well-being [35,54], in addition to mere physical or behavioral outcome. Selection criteria need 
to reflect on how likely a patient is to benefit from the DBS treatment, but should also 
consider if the patient has had reasonable access to other (experimental) less invasive 
treatments [55]. Last but not least, an interdisciplinary approach to guide informed consent is 
mandatory [28,39,40]. On one hand this would prevent that the surrogate is seen as a “passive 
spokesperson” [29]. On the other hand the interdisciplinary panel can contribute to avoid 
misconception [29]. There is no clarification in the literature so far how this should be done. 
Limits to the risk-benefit ratio 
If more research in DBS for DoC would be reasonable to conduct, there is as yet no 
experimental set-up thinkable that could identify the optimal brain target for DBS, or the 
optimal stimulation parameters. Also, it has been said that understanding the molecular basis 
of consciousness or DoC could be very important for further investigation of DBS [52]. 
Moreover, the mode of action of DBS itself is not well understood. Currently, assumptions are 
made that there must be integrity of neuronal tissue that enables connectivity between cortex, 
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thalamus and brainstem. On this issue, the findings of Magrassi et al. 2016 were rather 
pessimistic: even if the assumptions are true, DBS would only be applicable in few patients 
[26]. This puts limits on patient selection strategies. Additionally, the idea of “healing” 
consciousness by mere stimulation of a particular brain region itself is potentially 
confounding. Although not based on any evidence, the concept that the nature of 
consciousness is more holistic than localized, reveals a potential pitfall in the approach of 
DBS for DoC [32].  
The rationale behind Deep Brain Stimulation for Disorders of Consciousness 
The most publicized report by Schiff et al. published in 2007 in Nature [24] raised 
expectations about the potential of DBS for DoC, however, their unique experience did not 
lead to any breakthrough in this field.  
Nevertheless, while DBS for DoC has not yet any proven potential, there is a belief that it is 
worthwhile investigating. A key driver for this is the recognition of the neglect of patients 
with DoC by healthcare, and that there is no other treatment available. Though the goal of 
trying to find a treatment for these patients is per se ethical, this does not as such a priori 
justify the use of DBS. Important and conflictual ethical considerations remain.  
However, assuming a proper diagnosis of the DoC, judicious selection criteria of patients, a 
respect for the time frame of possible spontaneous recovery, a multidisciplinary panel 
including ethicists, a scientific choice of brain target for DBS and a comprehensive evaluation 
of outcome, one may consider a trial whereby patients are implanted with DBS with a blinded 
randomized cross-over design, or a design by which half the operated patients are stimulated 
immediately and the other half serve as control, with possibility to turn on stimulation at a 
later time point.  
 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, the reports in the literature on DBS for DoC are not satisfying in terms of 
providing clues as to the validity of using DBS in these conditions. The ethical issues are 
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multifaceted and far from agreed upon. Further investigation of the technique has to be based 
on the mere assumption that it could provide more evidence for the eventual potential of DBS 
in selected cases of DoC. This ethical challenge is on top of the lack of evidence that DBS for 
DoC can restore both consciousness and communication, even though absence of evidence 
may not mean evidence of absence. Until comprehensive double-blind studies are performed, 
DBS for DoC must be evaluated meticulously on a case per case basis.  
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Figure 1: Flowchart of systematic review strategy.  
n: number of publications. DBS: Deep Brain Stimulation 
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Table 1: Overview of patient reports of DBS for DoC 
Authors No. of 
patients, 
sex, age  
Etiology Interval 
injury to 
DBS 
implant 
(months) 
Diagnosis Follow-
up after 
surgery 
(months) 
Outcome  
 
Brain targets Stimulation 
parameters 
Comments 
Mode of stimulation 
Chudy et al. 
2017 [27] 
One male, 17 Anoxic (CA) 2 MCS 60 -Regained consciousness 
-Largely independent 
 
CMPf 
(preferentially on 
left side, but, 
if too damaged 
right side) 
Monopolar, 
25 Hz, 90 µs, 
2.5-3.5 V 
Stim Int 0.5/2 DT 
 One male, 23 Anoxic (CA) 2 MCS 57 -Regained consciousness 
-Largely independent, 
-“still experiences short 
term memory 
impairment and 
emotional regression” 
 
 One female, 
15 
TBI 11 MCS 51 -Regained consciousness 
- “has a severe left side 
hemiparesis and needs 
assistance in everyday 
life”. 
-Needs wheelchair 
 
 Seven male, 
17, 17, 20, 
25, 34, 43, 59 
Four female: 
16, 28, 39, 49 
 
3 TBI 
8 anoxic (CA) 
3-138 1 MCS 
10 VS 
38-59 -1 VS improved to MCS 
-3 died 
-7 no recovery 
Adams et al. 
2016 [21] 
One male, 38 TBI 252 MCS 58 Variable CRS-R of 
11-14 
Same as Schiff et 
al. 2007 
Same as Schiff 
et al. 2007 
-Change in sleep pattern 
recorded via EEG 
-Stim 12/12 DT 
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Magrassi et 
al. 2016 [26] 
One male, 58 TBI 28 MCS 
(CRS-R 14) 
18 CRS-R 15 
Bilateral, anterior 
intralaminar 
thalamic nuclei 
and adjacent 
paralaminar 
regions  
1 unipolar 
2 bipolar, 
80-110 Hz 
(median 100 Hz) 
-The method used is 
called CATS: Cortical 
Activation by Thalamic 
Stimulation. 
-Stim 14/10 DT 
 One male, 23 TBI 34 VS/UWS 
(CRS-R 8) 
60 CRS-R 11 
 One male, 29 TBI 96 VS/UWS 
(CRS-R 6) 
 
59 CRS-R 9 
Wojtecki et 
al. 2014 [23]  
One female, 
45 
TBI 
(closed head 
injury) 
84 DoC 
(GCS 4) 
na -No recovery (yet) 
-Patient had increased 
brain activity on 
response to her children 
CT (internal 
medullary lamina 
and the nuclei 
reticularis 
thalami) 
70-250 Hz, other 
parameters same 
as Schiff et al. 
2007 
-The aim of the study was 
to record EEG and “field 
potentials from the 
central thalamus” 2 days 
after DBS implantation 
and prior to 
internalization  
Schiff et al. 
2007 [24] 
(see also 
Giacino et al. 
[37]) 
One male, 38 TBI 
(closed head 
injury) 
78 MCS 24  CRS-R subscales, 
various improvements 
(arousal, motor and 
communication as 
primary measures) 
-Restoration of 
communication 
(“interact consistently 
and meaningfully”) 
 
Bilateral, anterior 
intralaminar 
thalamic nuclei 
and adjacent 
paralaminar 
regions 
Left monopolar, 
right bipolar, 
100 Hz, 4 V 
-Parameter optimization 
70-250 Hz and 0-5 V 
-6 months double-blind 
crossover study 
-3 times 30 subsequent 
days on, 30 days off 
-Side-effect: vomiting 
-patient had intact 
language networks 
-Adams et al. mention for 
this case that if DBS is 
on, Stim 12/12 DT 
 
Yamamoto et 
al. 2002-
2013 
[13,22,45,49–
51] 
 
5 patients, 
18-47 
(mean= 33.5 
±14.3) 
3 TBI 
2 vascular 
3-6 MCS 120 All 5 recovered, live at 
home with family 
-Severe disabled 
condition (GOS) 
-Need wheelchair, 4/5 
patients “could not 
operate wheelchair by 
themselves” 
5 CMPf, 
unilateral, less 
injured side 
Bipolar, mostly 
25 Hz, various 
intensities 
Stim Int 0.5/3 DT 
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(continued) 
Yamamoto et 
al. 
Four female, 
19, 41, 58, 59 
Three male, 
30, 43, 75 
One person, 
(na) 
6 vascular 
2 TBI 
3-6* PVS 
(PCS 2-5) 
120 -All 8 recovered: 
-7 are bedridden 
(PCS 8-10) 
-1 is “able to live in a 
wheelchair” 
-Able to communicate 
“with some speech or 
other responses” 
-Need assistance for 
everyday life in bed 
-Severe disabled 
condition (GOS)  
-19 CMPf 
-2 mesencephalic 
reticular formation 
-Unilateral, less 
injured side 
Bipolar, 
mostly 25 Hz, 
various 
intensities 
-4/21 patients survived 10 
years after DBS 
-Stim Int 0.5/3 DT 
-Included 8 patients 
overlap with Tsubokawa 
et al. 
Seven male, 
29, 30, 42, 
44, 48, 49, 56 
Six female: 
30, 39, 41, 
44, 61, 74 
7 TBI 
3 vascular 
3 anoxic 
3-6* PVS 
(PCS 2-5) 
 
120 -All 13 no recovery 
(PCS 3-7) 
Cohadon & 
Richer 1993 
[20] 
25 patients, 
(na) 
na >3 VS 12-144 -1 improvement to mo-
derate disability (GOS) 
-10 improvement to 
severe disability (GOS) 
-2 died  
-12 no recovery 
CMPf 2 monopolar and 
23 bipolar 
50 Hz, 
5-10 mV [sic], 
5 msec. 
-Improvement measured 
with score task system: 
from 0-10% to 30-60% 
-Stim 12/12 DT 
 
 
Hosobuchi & 
Yingling 
1993 [19] 
One male, 23 Anoxic 
(ischemia) 
8 Apallic 
state, 
GCS < 6 
10 Improvement 
-Oral feeding possible 
-Could respond to verbal 
commands 
-Could not shake or nod 
the head on yes/no 
questions 
na 
na 
(amplitude 
increased till 
“30% of the 
arousal 
threshold”) 
-Blind study 
-Stim 12/12 DT 
 Two male, 
35, 35 
One female, 
27 
2 TBI 
1 anoxic 
(ischemia) 
10-36 apallic state, 
GCS < 6 
12-18 -All 3 no recovery 
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Tsubokawa et 
al. 1990 [25] 
(see also 
Katayama et 
al. [56]) 
Five male, 
24, 43, 44, 
48, 75 
Three 
female, 41, 
41, 74 
4 TBI 
3 vascular 
1 anoxic 
>6* PVS 
(PCS 2-4) 
12 -3 “full recovery” 
(PCS 8-9) 
-1 incomplete recovery 
(PCS 7) 
-3 no recovery (PCS 3-5) 
-6 non-specific 
thalamic nucleus 
(CMPf) 
-2 Nucleus 
cuneiformis in 
mesencephalic 
reticular formation 
-Unilateral 
50 Hz, 
0-10 V 
-Stim 2/22 DT (4 times 
30 min) 
-See Yamamoto et al. for 
precise information about 
the outcome (overlapping 
patients). 
Sturm et al. 
1979 [18] 
One male, 68 Outcome of 
operation for 
aneurysm, 
probably 
ischemia of 
the brain stem 
<1 “subcoma 
with uncon-
sciousness” 
2 -Partial and temporary 
limited improvement 
-After 2 months the 
patient died from 
pneumonia 
-Right rostral part 
of the lamella 
medialis thalami 
-Left nucleus 
reticulatus 
polaris thalami 
Bipolar 
6-10 V, 50 Hz, 
0.5 msec 
-After 4 days, the right 
side electrode was 
removed. 
-Stim 10/12 DT Int 
0,16/1 (10 min each hour) 
Hassler et al. 
1969 [17] 
One male, 26 TBI 5 “apallic 
syndrome” 
or 
“coma vigil” 
<1 -Improvement of 
consciousness 
-Spontaneous 
movements of the left 
limbs 
-Unintelligible 
vocalization 
-Basal portion of 
the left lateropolar 
nucleus of the 
thalamus 
-Basal part of the 
right pallidum 
Left: 25-50 Hz, 
20 V 
Right: 8 Hz, 
30 V 
1-3 msec 
-After 19 days the 
electrodes were removed. 
There was no further gain 
of either consciousness or 
vocalization. 
-Stim Int 0,25/6 or 0,25/8 
(3-4 times/day) 
McLardy et 
al. 1968 [16] 
One male, 19 TBI 7 “coma 
vigilans” 
24 -Could move left hand 
-No change in 
consciousness 
-Died 24 months after 
surgery 
Left thalamus and 
left midbrain for 
intralaminar 
nuclei and 
reticular formation 
250 Hz, 1 msec   
Total  78 patients         
CA: Cardiac arrest; CT: “Central Thalamus”; CMPf: Centre Median Parafascicular complex; CRS-R: JFK Coma Recovery Scale Revised; DBS: Deep Brain Stimulation; DoC: Disorders of 
Consciousness; DT: stimulation during Day Time; MCS: Minimally Conscious State; na: not available; GCS: Glasgow Coma Scale; GOS: Glasgow Outcome Scale; PCS: Prolonged Coma 
Scale; PVS: Persistent Vegetative State; Stim: Stimulation cycle of DBS in hours ON/ hours OFF; Stim Int: Intermittent Stimulation in hours ON/total period in hours; TBI: Traumatic 
Brain Injury; UWS: Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome; VS: Vegetative State. *in one of the 21 patients the interval from injury to DBS implant was 8 months, but the etiology of the 
DoC was not specified. There were inconsistencies regarding this patients between different reports (reference 22 vs. reference 28).   
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Table 2: Overview of ethical considerations of DBS for DoC 
Authors Patient issues 
-Self-determination 
-Awareness of disability 
Patient’s surrogate 
-Informed consent by proxy 
DBS as technique 
-Risks and limitations 
-Side-effects 
-Potential 
-Alternatives 
Care 
-Diagnosis 
-Health care 
Scientific research 
-Selection of patients 
-Application 
Society 
-Patients with DoC 
through eyes of 
society. 
Dagi 2010 [41]  To convey the risks and 
benefits of DBS is sometimes 
not possible: the intervention in 
the consciousness of a person 
may be “ineffable”. DBS 
requires a highly personal 
approach to assess whether the 
given consent is thoroughly to 
protect the patient’s needs. 
    
Fins 2000 [28] Patients with TBI are often 
neglected in care. TBI is too 
quickly seen as immutable, 
this is called “therapeutic 
nihilism”. Self-awareness of 
patient’s disability is 
problematic, but we need to 
consider that DBS is 
reversible. 
Next-of-kin should be 
recognized as legal surrogate. 
There is a lack of accurate 
information to the surrogate on 
the prospect of the patient. 
Although one cannot harm 
PVS patients more than 
MCS, the risk-benefit of 
DBS in MCS patients is 
better and more ethical. 
 Research on humans is 
justified. Focus trials 
-on MCS patients. 
-TBI as etiology 
-comprehensive 
baseline assessment 
prior to selection 
“responsible and 
responsive research 
agenda” 
 
Fins 2016 [38]  Informed consent can be 
assessed different for a patient, 
when the target is to restore 
communication. 
DBS has been proven safe 
for drug-resistant 
Parkinson’s. 
When the diagnosis is 
other than MCS and 
TBI, misconception is 
fostered, e.g. a patient 
with anoxic injury. 
Participants should be 
enrolled in a clinical 
study, with a plausible 
hypothesis and with 
surrogate consent.  
There is an ethical 
framework, distinct 
from “the dark 
legacy of 
psychosurgery”. 
Fins 2016 [30]    We need “medical 
parity”: a medical care 
for DoC patients. 
 We need “to view 
consciousness, 
when it is present, 
as a civil right.” 
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Georgiopoulus 
et al. 2010 [55] 
  In a systematic review on 
treatment of DoC one 
cannot yet conclude which 
approach (DBS, nerve 
stimulation, SCS drugs) is 
most appropriate. 
 
 We need double-blind 
research. 
 
Giacino et al. 
2013 [31] 
Patients that possibly could 
benefit from intensive care 
for long term, do often not 
remain in treatment. 
Trials sometimes limit 
treatment options, and as a 
result “families are reluctant to 
consent”. This is not beneficial 
for control groups in research. 
There is not yet a 
conclusion on 
rehabilitation strategy, but 
we “should center on 
mobilization strategies” as 
there is “no evidence that 
they are unsafe” 
 
There is “no 
standardized 
evaluation” for patients 
with DoC.  
Misdiagnosis range 
“from 37-43%”. 
There is a suggestion 
that rTMS might be 
useful for patient 
selection for DBS. 
The “beliefs of poor 
outcome in this 
patient population 
are incorrect”. 
Gillett 2011 
[32] 
-There is a risk that the 
patient’s well-being would 
be severely corroded. “Risk 
of Unacceptable Badness” 
-There is a risk that the real 
needs of the patients are 
neglected.  
 DBS application should 
be carefully reflected to 
prevent that the ethical 
justification would be the 
same as the “Gold plated 
leucotomy standard”. 
i.e., the justification used 
by Walter Freeman to 
perform leucotomy, 
biased by his own 
collection of evidence and 
clinical judgement. 
 
The uncertainty on the 
diagnosis of VS or 
MCS is significant. 
 We should not 
reduce a comatose 
human to a mere 
dysfunction of some 
nuclei. 
DBS and 
psychosurgery must 
be considered 
within a holistic 
approach. 
Glannon 2016 
[54] 
The overall experience of 
the patient in the outcome 
of DBS has to be assessed 
rather than only symptoms. 
 General adverse effects of 
DBS are to be considered 
 
 
 
 
 So far, “there is no 
definitive evidence” that 
DBS in DoC can restore 
higher cognitive 
functions. 
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Glannon 2010 
[43] 
 There is a chance that DBS 
generates “unreasonable 
expectations”. 
The “quality of life” 
should be carefully 
assessed with and without 
DBS. It is ethical to use 
DBS only if there is “a 
high probability that the 
technique will benefit the 
patient” and there is no 
alternative. 
 There is insufficient 
evidence to know 
whether side-effects are 
“temporary or 
permanent”. 
 
Glannon 2008 
[35] 
The patient’s psychological 
condition is as much as 
important as the physical 
and cognitive condition. 
-Proxy consent is possible, but 
after thoroughly discussion. 
-The consent depends on the 
cognitive and physical 
outcome, however, too often 
the pitfall is made to overlook 
the psychological condition if 
the patients become aware of 
their impairment.  
A better investigation of 
the benefits and risks is 
needed, such as the long-
term outcomes, in order to 
inform the surrogate. 
 DBS as an innovative 
technique can be 
ethically justified, if the 
quality-of-life of the 
patients is carefully 
assessed. 
 
Lanoix 2010 
[29] 
Refers to Fins: comatose 
patients are “vulnerable to 
being denied” and hence 
research in DBS in those 
patients is an “ethical 
obligation”.  
The judgement of the surrogate 
cannot be made thoroughly as 
there is no standardized health 
care for patients with DoC. 
Hence, the surrogate might 
overestimate the benefits of 
participation in research for the 
patient (misconception) 
The minimizing risk of 
DBS cannot be seen 
independent of optimizing 
care. 
There is no 
standardized health 
care for DoC. 
The researchers should 
carefully support the 
surrogate in making a 
decision, to ensure the 
best interest of the 
patient. 
 
Patuzzo & 
Manganotti 
2014 [34] 
 “DBS for PVS does not require 
informed consent” but a “start-
informed consent”, because 
DBS can be seen as a necessary 
treatment or “ordinary medical 
intervention” of PVS. 
In PVS patients, there is 
no risk of DBS to damage 
“mental integrity, since in 
PVS the human brain is 
already severely 
damaged”. 
   
Schiff et al. 
2002 [40] 
 Participation in research should 
rely on an interdisciplinary 
dialogue. 
The risk is limited as it is 
adjustable and reversible. 
 DBS research is 
justifiable because there 
are no good alternatives.  
Research for 
treatment of DoC 
must be seen as “a 
societal imperative” 
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Schiff & Fins 
2007 [36] 
 The specific etiology of PVS 
and MCS does not justify the 
“categorical exclusion” of these 
patients based on their 
decisional incapacity. Surrogate 
consent is needed and ethical. 
  Schiff and Fins raise 
strong criticism on 
former DBS study 
design. Some errors 
frequently made are: 
-DBS applied within the 
“time frame for 
spontaneous recovery” 
-no blinding 
-no good baseline 
assessment, or linkage 
DBS/behavior 
-poor diagnosis or bad 
criteria VS/MCS 
-no assessment of carry-
over effects 
 
Schiff et al. 
2009 [33] 
The assumption “that the 
patient in MCS would 
forever remain permanently 
unware of his or her 
predicament is called into 
question”. Hence, there is a 
change in the risk-benefit 
ratio. 
 DBS for MCS could 
become a “halfway 
technology”, an important 
treatment for MCS, but 
not solving the core of the 
problem. 
  The patients are 
suffering from a 
“societal neglect 
syndrome”. 
Sen et al. 2010 
[8] 
Suicidal ideation is reported 
in patients with TBI (3%-
33%). 
The family has to decide very 
quickly whether to withhold 
life-sustaining therapy or not, 
while normally an observation 
of 12 months is needed to 
assess the recovery of the 
patient. 
he research of DBS is 
very limited so far and 
therefore “no definitive 
conclusions can be made”. 
Diagnostic errors are 
very problematic (up to 
40%). The 
communication and 
responsiveness of the 
patients have to be 
examined very 
carefully. 
The early researches on 
DBS in coma states are 
confounded by the 
actual meaning of coma 
(PVS or MCS) and also 
by “the window of 
spontaneous recovery”. 
 
DBS: Deep Brain Stimulation, DoC: Disorders of Consciousness, MCS: Minimally Conscious State, PVS: Persistent Vegetative State. SCS: Spinal Cord Stimulation. rTMS: repetitive 
Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation, TBI: Traumatic Brain Injury, VS: vegetative state. Note: Arguments that are mentioned in several publications by the same author(s) are not repeated. 
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Deep Brain Stimulation for Disorders of Consciousness 
 
Highlights 
 
• Spontaneous recovery can often not be excluded in outcomes of DBS for DoC 
• Proxy consent and patients’ self-awareness of own limitations are main ethical issues 
• There is no satisfying clinical evidence for a meaningful effect of DBS for DoC 
• DBS for DoC must be evaluated case by case, including a psychological assessment 
 
 
